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Abstract  
This paper presents recent research assessing the impact of the financial crisis on young and 
established Technology-Based Small Firms (TBSFs) and considers whether their ability to contribute 
to economic growth is being affected by ongoing problems in obtaining external finance.  It reports on 
original findings from a survey of 100 TBSFs undertaken in late 2010 as well as 20 in-depth interviews 
with a range of finance providers.  The surviving TBSFs exhibited considerable demand for external 
finance since 2007, particularly for working capital and early stage R&D, sought mainly from banks, 
but also with younger TBSFs seeking business angel finance and innovation grants and more mature 
TBSFs seeking venture capital finance. However, both debt and equity finance have become harder 
to access for TBSFs, particularly for early stage funding and for more R&D intensive firms, hampering 
their growth potential. Where external finance has been available, the terms and conditions set by 
providers were often unacceptable to business owners. The paper concludes that the smooth 
operation of the finance escalator has proved difficult to achieve under recent financial conditions and 
identifies a number of breakpoints relating to TBSFs which government policy needs to address.  
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Introduction 
It is generally accepted that a dynamic technology based small firm (TBSF) sector (1) is pivotal to 
enhancing entrepreneurship and innovation, leading to economic growth and the creation of new jobs 
(Siegel, Westhead and Wright 2003; NESTA 2009b). However, TBSFs face greater obstacles than 
conventional SMEs due to market failures which restrict key inputs, most notably finance (Murray and 
Lott 1995; Oakey 2003). For instance, Carpenter and Peterson (2002) argued that high-tech small 
firms are more likely to be financially constrained than other small firms because they suffer from 
finance market imperfections, thereby curtailing their contribution to economic growth. Moreover, 
evidence from a high-tech firms’ survey in the UK (Westhead and Storey 1997) showed that it was 
those with ‘the most sophisticated technologies’ that faced continual financial constraints to the 
development of the business. More recent research also indicated that TBSF growth and development 
was being hindered by a shortage of external finance, notably the availability of relatively small 
amounts of equity finance (Pierrakis and Mason 2008). In view of previous evidence indicating access 
to external finance to be negatively affected by economic conditions (Bougheas, Mizena,and Yalcinb 
2006) as well as recent surveys indicating the difficulties that SMEs have experienced in obtaining 
external finance since the onset of the credit crunch in 2007 (Cosh et al. 2009; Fraser 2009; IFF 2010), 
it seems reasonable to expect TBSFs to have been particularly adversely affected by the recent 
financial crisis. Indeed, it has been suggested that those small businesses most capable of creating 
new jobs and stimulating economic growth are being prevented from doing so by limited access to 
investment capital because lenders, particularly banks, ignore growth orientations and potential during 
recessionary periods (Cowling ,Liu, and Ledger 2012).  
Given this context, this paper presents some evidence on the experiences of TBSFs in the UK on 
accessing external finance during the depressed market and tighter financial conditions that existed 
between 2007 and 2010. The research, undertaken in 2010-11, assesses the impact of the financial 
crisis on a sample of 100 TBSFs, examining their requirements for debt, equity and grant finance 
since 2007 and the extent to which this has been met from different external sources. A key 
underlying question is the extent to which the ability of both young and more established TBSFs to 
contribute to the UK’s economic recovery is being held back by ongoing problems in obtaining the 
external finance needed for growth. Various characteristics relating to the sample of TBSFs are 
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explored in order to consider the extent to which they exhibit demand for different forms of external 
finance and are able to access it. These include: trading age (distinguishing between younger and 
more established firms); sector (comparing bio/life-science and electronics/IT firms); business origin, 
with a focus on comparing spin outs (from universities, research institutes, or existing companies) and 
non-spin outs; and the stage of development for which finance was being sought (i.e. seed finance, 
early stage finance, later R&D and commercialisation). In addition to this telephone interview survey 
of owner-managers of TBSFs, 20 interviews were conducted with a range of finance providers 
(including banks, business angels, public and private venture capital funds) in order to provide a 
supply-side perspective on the financing of TBSFs since the onset of the financial crisis.  
 
Theoretical context 
Financing the growth of TBSFs 
In their seminal paper on the financing of small businesses, Berger and Udell (1998) explain how the 
financial needs and options of small firms change as they become ‘less informationally opaque’ to 
potential finance providers. A central tenet of their financial growth cycle model is that the inter-
connectedness and substitutability between different sources of finance is crucial to financing the 
continuous development of businesses, especially those that have high growth potential but are high 
risk. To illustrate this they give the examples of contracts between entrepreneurs and business angels 
being made in anticipation of future venture capital and debt finance from commercial banks being 
predicated on having sufficient equity from angel investors and venture capitalists to reduce the risks 
associated with information asymmetry. Because of the informational opacity of small businesses, 
Berger and Udell (1998, 651) go on to argue that small businesses “are likely to bear a 
disproportionate share of the loss of funding that occurs when there is market failure”.  Also, at times 
of financial distress and economic downturn, small businesses are likely to be especially vulnerable 
not only to banks reducing their credit risk exposure but also to the reduced flow of funds into 
business angel and venture capital equity markets coming from public equity (via an initial public 
offering (IPO)) and trade sales).  
 
High risk SMEs, such as innovative TBSFs, are particularly likely to be adversely affected by finance 
market imperfections and funding gaps because of the greater risks to funding providers of adverse 
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selection and moral hazard problems which increase the marginal cost of finance (Carpenter and 
Peterson 2002). Banks perceive early stage TBSFs to be too risky and do not fully understand the 
potential commercial value of innovation, particularly where information is limited and not always 
transparent (Schmid 2001) and assets are intangible and knowledge based (Hsu 2004). Also, the 
owners of innovative TBSFs may be reluctant to provide full information about their planned 
developments because of concerns that disclosure may make it easier for others to exploit their ideas 
(Shane and Cable 2002). Moreover, the use of standard credit scoring techniques by banks tends to 
favour established trading businesses with collateral rather than higher risk enterprises with intangible 
assets (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Bank of England 1996 and 2001; Cressy 2002). For their part, 
venture capital (VC) investors may consider the transaction costs of investing small amounts in seed 
and early stage ventures to be prohibitively expensive and risky (Trester 1998; Bruno and Tyebjee 
1985; Lockett, Murray and Wright 2002) as they require a disproportionate amount of managerial 
input from VC fund managers relative to the size of the investment (Murray and Lingelbach 2009). 
Thus information asymmetry in the VC market arises not necessarily because the information is 
unavailable, but because it is too expensive to collect relative to the potential benefit from the 
investment. For these reasons therefore, younger TBSFs are likely to be more financially constrained 
than more established ones because of their lack of a trading history and greater information 
opaqueness.  More specifically, those firms seeking early stage finance are expected to have 
experienced the greatest difficulties in obtaining both debt and equity finance over the 2007-2010 
period.  This is likely to have impacted most severely on more R&D intensive businesses that are still 
at the pre-trading stage.  
  
Funding gaps in the finance escalator  
As a contemporary variant of the financial growth cycle model, the concept of a finance escalator is 
often used to identify the substitutability and transition from one type of funding to another that is 
needed to ensure the smooth, sequential development of innovative R&D intensive small firms 
(NESTA 2009a; Mason, Jones, and Wells 2010). The finance escalator describes that, beyond the 
use of initial investment from the founders, family and friends, TBSFs rely on a staged sequence of 
types of external funding during their early development, with public and private sources often 
complementing each other (Oakey 2003). This typically involves access to four main types: (i) public 
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seed grants; (ii) private equity from business angels and public supported venture capital; (iii) 
corporate and institutional venture capital; and (iv) bank debt finance. The types and combinations of 
external finance used will typically depend upon the stage reached in the product/service 
development cycle. First, during the pre-trading, initial feasibility stages, when the business concept is 
too risky for either debt or equity finance, public grant seed funding (i.e. for proof of concept) is often 
sought; second, during the early stages of R&D prior to trading, private equity finance is accessed 
from business angels either acting individually or in syndicates; and third, during the later stages of 
development involving prototyping, manufacture and commercialisation (including sales and 
marketing and establishing foreign sales agents), larger scale private and corporate venture capital 
may be used. Additionally, if the TBSF is established with revenue income, or is close to 
commercialisation with proven markets, bank debt finance and other options (e.g. invoice financing) 
become available.   
However, even before the recent financial crisis, there was mounting evidence that the escalator, at 
least as it applies in the UK, was not functioning as well as theory would suggest, resulting in a 
number of funding gaps concerning the availability of risk capital. For example, in relation to pre-
trading seed funding, Mason, Jones, and Wells (2010) suggest that it has proved historically difficult to 
generate commercial returns, due to high rates of failure, the intensive levels of investor management 
required and long periods to payback investments, with the result that the funding of this stage has 
become reliant on informal finance and public seed grants. In addition, there is evidence of a widening 
gap between early stage business angel equity finance and later stage private VC funding as 
institutional VCs in particular shift towards making fewer, less risky, later stage investments (Pierrakis 
and Mason 2008).  For example, research in Scotland indicated that VCs have been shifting towards 
‘follow-on’ and later stage rather than new investments, creating a larger gap for new and early stage 
risk capital and thereby constraining the availability of funding for the next generation of TBSFs 
(Johnston, Greig, and Harrison 2008; Harrison et al. 2010). This ‘locking in’ of equity funds to protect 
existing investments has exacerbated the situation, due in part to a lack of intermediate stage sales 
(i.e. between angels and VCs) and also final exits (e.g. IPOs, trade sales, licensing).  
There are therefore a number of reasons for thinking that the finance escalator is not working as 
theory and government policy suggest it should.  Mason, Jones and Wells (2010) for example 
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describe recent UK financing of TBSFs as a protracted and drawn out ‘drip feed’ of investment, far 
from the slick and efficient finance escalator envisaged in the UK Government’s Innovation Nation 
White Paper (BIS 2008). We are therefore interested to see whether our research evidence, 
combining experiences from the demand side with insights from the supply side, helps to identify 
various breakage points in the escalator as it relates to the financing of TBSFs since the onset of the 
financial crisis.  
 
Given this literature context, this paper examines the following four propositions concerning the 
financing of TBSFs since the onset of the financial crisis:  
(1) Younger TBSFs, especially those firms seeking early stage finance, are likely to have 
experienced the greatest difficulties in obtaining both debt and equity finance. 
(2) More R&D intensive businesses, such as those found in the bio/life sciences sector, are likely 
to have been the most financially constrained because of their greater reliance on attracting 
longer-term, equity capital. 
(3) The growth of TBSFs is being stunted by a lack of external finance, especially those with the 
most growth potential.   
(4) TBSFs are not experiencing the kind of smooth, sequential transition from one funding source 
to another envisaged by the finance escalator model, with their development being held back 
by a succession of funding gaps/breakage points.   
The remainder of the paper sets out the methodology and then examines the key findings from the 
demand-side TBSF survey, focusing on the extent of their demand and access to different types of 
formal external finance and how this has impacted on growth and development. These findings are 
then discussed in relation to the key themes emerging from the supply-side interviews with finance 
providers, followed by the key conclusions and implications of the research findings.   
Research Methodology 
TBSFs can be subject to various definitional ambiguities because of their heterogeneity, operating 
across different sectors and at different stages of the production/service development cycle. According 
to government data sources (ABI 2008), they represent six per cent of the UK business population, are 
predominately micro businesses (over 90 per cent have less than 10 employees), and are dominated 
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by IT businesses (80 per cent), with bio and life sciences and specialist R&D businesses representing 
less than five per cent (Table 1). This research is not intended to be representative of the whole TBSF 
sector but focuses on small (less than 100 employees) independent technology based businesses 
operating in the growing sectors that have been associated with seeking risk finance in recent years 
(CEEDR 2010 and 2012; NESTA 2009b). The aim was to survey sufficient numbers of digital 
electronics/IT and bio/life science TBSFs to provide reliable insights into their experiences of trying to 
access finance. To achieve this the survey was weighted towards bio/life science businesses, with an 
emphasis on R&D intensive activities (see Table 1 notes) rather than the IT consultancy services 
which swamp the TBSF sector numerically.  
The focus is on surviving independent TBSFs and does not include trade sales or closures that 
occurred over the study period (2). An inevitable limitation of this survivorship bias in the sample is that 
the researchers do not know how many TBSFs went out of business (or never got off the ground) 
during the 2007-10 period because of the difficulties of obtaining finance.         
The survey involved extended telephone interviews (typically half an hour in length) with owner-
managers and finance directors from two TBSF samples during the second half of 2010. The first 
sample comprised established TBSFs, located in four English regions (Greater London, East of 
England, South East, and North West) and Scotland. Initially the plan was to re-survey 50 out of 133 
TBSFs previously surveyed on business financing in 2003 (Ullah and Taylor 2007). However, the low 
response rate (22 per cent), due mainly to TBSFs being untraceable (29 per cent), sold or acquired 
(11 per cent), or unable or unwilling to participate (38 per cent), necessitated the survey to be boosted 
by contacting previous non-respondent firms, resulting in a total of 51 completed interviews with 
established TBSFs. The second sample comprised younger TBSFs, established since 2005, random 
quota sampled from Dun & Bradstreet’s Global Reference Solutions UK database (3,333 TBSFs 
distributed evenly across the above English regions and Scotland). A total of 245 firms were 
contacted, resulting in 49 completed telephone interviews (20 per cent response) with younger TBSFs. 
It is acknowledged that some response bias may exist as it is problematic assessing non respondents’ 
characteristics given the paucity of available data on these firms, particularly in respect of new TBSFs.    
The sector distribution was closely matched between the established and younger TBSFs (Table 1), 
with the main sectors represented being electronic and scientific engineering (35 per cent), contract 
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R&D (22 per cent), IT (21 per cent) and pharmaceutical and chemical engineering (14 per cent). To 
facilitate broad sector comparisons, TBSFs were assigned as either bio/life science activities (38 firms) 
or electronics/IT activities (62 firms). 
   
[Insert table 1 about here]  
 
Uniquely amongst recent studies of TBSF financing, the research also involved obtaining a supply-side 
perspective by conducting 20 interviews (mostly by telephone although some face-to-face) with a 
range of debt, equity and grant financiers and intermediaries in early 2011 (Table 2).  These interviews 
helped to enrich the interpretation of the findings from the demand side survey, enabling a more 
rounded view of the financial circumstances facing TBSFs. The finance providers and facilitators were 
drawn from Scotland and the English regions covered by the TBSF survey and were mostly selected 
using the researchers’ existing contact networks.    
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
 
Our empirical evidence therefore comprises both quantitative data from the survey of TBSFs and 
more qualitative data from the interviews with both TBSF entrepreneurs and finance providers.  As 
well as undertaking univariate statistical analysis, binary logistic analysis was conducted on the 
survey data to explore the interrelationships between various characteristics of the TBSFs and identify 
the most significant factors.  Specifically, the analysis focused on (i) whether or not firms had sought 
external finance; (ii) whether or not they had received finance, in both cases also running separate 
analyses of bank finance and equity finance; and (iii) whether or not firms experienced problems 
accessing external finance.  
 
Before focusing on the ability of the TBSFs to access different sources of external finance during the 
period of the financial crisis, the next section of the paper profiles the characteristics of the surveyed 
businesses, including their growth orientation and performance over the 2007-10 period.    
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Characteristics and Growth Performance of Surveyed TBSFs 
 
The surveyed TBSFs are markedly different from the UK SME population as a whole, being more 
growth oriented and demonstrating a greater propensity to seek external formal finance, particularly 
equity finance. Analysis based on the UK Small Business Survey for both 2007 (Williams and Cowling 
2009) and 2010 (IFF 2011), thereby covering the financing period of this research, acts as a 
benchmark for such comparisons.  
 
Most of the established TBSFs had existed for at least ten years (median year of establishment, 
1997). It is notable that almost one in ten of them had taken over three years to start trading, with 
bio/life science firms being more likely to require a longer lead time than their electronics/IT 
counterparts (19 per cent compared to 11 per cent took over one year). Just over a third (37 per cent) 
of all the surveyed TBSFs originated as spin outs from other companies or universities. This was 
significantly (.01 level) higher amongst the younger firms (53 per cent of them) than the established 
ones (22 per cent), possibly indicating that spin out companies, which tend to be the most innovative 
firms, were more likely to have been sold to or acquired by other companies at the commercialisation 
stage than their non-spin out counterparts (Wiklund and Söderblom 2006). A higher proportion of 
bio/life science (45 per cent of them) than electronics/IT (32 per cent) firms were spin outs.   
 
The surveyed TBSFs were more growth oriented than SMEs as a whole, with 67 per cent of them 
aiming to grow during the period of the financial crisis (Table 3) compared to 53 per cent of SMEs 
having growth aspirations in 2007. Spin outs were the most growth orientated (76 per cent of them), 
whilst a fifth (21 per cent) of bio/life science firms were not ready to grow, this being indicative of the 
longer lead time to commercialisation for some young bio/life science firms.     
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
Despite the economic recession, three fifths (59 per cent, n=78, proportionally the same when deflated 
turnover figures are used (3)) of the surveyed TBSFs managed to grow their sales turnover over the 
2007-10 period, with less than a third (28 per cent) experiencing a decrease. This compares 
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favourably with SMEs as a whole (35 per cent exhibiting sales growth in 2007 and 23 per cent in 
2010). Just one third of TBSFs (Table 3) reported that growth had been constrained by weakening and 
in some cases falling demand, with the electronics/IT firms appearing to be more affected (43 per cent 
of them) than their bio/life science counterparts (24 per cent). The mean sales turnover of the 
established TBSFs increased by 35 per cent over the three years and that of their younger 
counterparts by 99 per cent (Table 4). The bio/life science TBSFs were faster growing than their 
electronics/IT counterparts, their mean sales turnover doubling compared to just a six per cent 
increase for electronics/IT firms.  
The surveyed TBSFs also proved to be an important source of new jobs, with half (49 per cent) of 
those established by 2007 increasing their employment over the next three years, a considerably 
higher proportion than found amongst SMEs as a whole (5 per cent of which increased employment in 
2007 and 11 per cent in 2010). The mean average employment growth for the surveyed TBSFs from 
2007-10 was 3.2 employees, representing 32 per cent growth (Table 4). The established TBSFs 
increased their mean average employment by 26 per cent, whilst the younger TBSFs increased by 56 
per cent. In line with their superior sales turnover performance, the mean employment increase for the 
bio/life science firms was six employees compared to 1.5 for the electronics/IT firms.     
[Insert table 4 about here] 
An overview is now presented of the demand for and success in obtaining different types of finance by 
the surveyed TBSFs over the 2007-10 period, based on analysing the business survey data, before 
using the more qualitative interview data to discuss the perspectives of both TBSF owner-managers 
and finance providers on recent changes in the availability of debt and risk capital.  
Access to Finance by Surveyed TBSFs 
As a result of their growth orientation and achievements, the surveyed TBSFs continued to have a 
relatively strong demand for finance over the 2007-10 period, particularly to fund working capital and 
R&D. As shown in Table 5, the majority (81 per cent) were financed wholly or partly from internal 
sources, using personal funding and ploughing back profits. Two-fifths of these were solely dependent 
on internal sources and were significantly (.05 level) more likely to be small electronics (IT software 
and telecoms) consultancies with low overheads and no desire to use external finance. A higher 
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proportion of younger TBSFs (10 per cent compared to two per cent of established TBSFs) used 
informal external finance from family and friends, confirming previous research indicating that TBSFs 
rely on personal and informal family finance in their early stages because they lack the collateral and 
track record required by banks and are likely to be considered to be too risky by equity investors 
(Mason and Harrison 2004).   
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
The surveyed TBSFs were far more active in seeking external finance over the 2007-10 period than 
SMEs as a whole. Overall, two thirds (66 per cent) of the TBSFs had sought formal external finance, 
with just over half (53 per cent) being at least partially successful, often in combination with internal 
sources. This compares with 17 per cent of SMEs in 2007 and 18 per cent in 2010 seeking external 
finance in the previous year. The partial success rate of the surveyed TBSFs applying for finance (79 
per cent) is in line with that for SMEs as a whole in 2007 (77 per cent) but considerably higher than in 
2010 (57 per cent). It is notable that the majority (41 of 66) of TBSFs seeking formal external finance 
over the period tended to be active in doing so, seeking two or more types of formal external finance, 
which may in part relate to the difficulties in obtaining the full amount that they were seeking from a 
single source if not to the complementarity between different sources. These TBSFs were certainly 
more active in seeking multiple sources of finance than their SME counterparts where slightly under 
one third of finance seekers sought multiple sources. There was little difference between younger and 
established TBSFs in their use of formal sources (55 per cent and 52 per cent respectively), which was 
highest amongst bio/life science firms (66 per cent) and spin outs (61 per cent).  
Binary logistic analysis, firstly using a series of tests to assess the significance of TBSF characteristics 
for all external finance seekers and those with trading performance records for 2007-10 (Table 6a: 
model 1), highlights the importance of external finance to bio/life science firms, as they were 
significantly (<.05 level) more likely to seek finance from formal sources and also significantly (<.001 
level) more likely to receive it over the 2007-10 period, as demonstrated by a second series of tests 
examining successful recipients amongst the applicant sub group (Table 6b: model 2a). When the 
stage of finance is included in the applicant sub group analysis (Table 6c: model 2b), it reveals that 
TBSFs seeking early stage funding were less likely to receive it than those requiring later stage 
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funding (<.1 level), thereby confirming our first proposition that one of the severest effects of the 
financial crisis for TBSFs has been on the availability of early stage finance needed to develop and 
test new product ideas.    
[Insert Tables 6a, 6b & 6c about here] 
Bank debt finance 
Bank debt finance was the most commonly sourced finance. Half the surveyed TBSFs approached 
banks from 2007-10, with a higher proportion of younger (60 per cent) TBSFs doing so than   
established (40 per cent) firms. This might not be what we would expect from the finance escalator 
model, but it should be noted that the younger businesses seeking bank finance included a 
significantly (.01 level) high proportion of ‘soft starts’ where founding entrepreneurs relied on revenue 
generated from R&D consultancy to finance their own product development and commercialisation 
(Bullock, 1983). Binary logistic analysis indicates that bio/life science firms were more likely to seek 
(although only at .25 level) and receive (<.05 level) bank finance than electronics/IT firms, indicating 
the importance of this source of finance to these TBSFs. This analysis also indicates that firms seeking 
early stage finance from banks were less likely to receive it than those seeking later stage finance 
(<.01 level; Table 6c).  
Over a third of TBSFs (36 per cent) applied for overdrafts and one quarter applied for term loans 
(Table 7). The majority applying for overdraft facilities were successful to some extent (81 per cent) as 
were those applying for term loans, although to a lesser extent (58 per cent). However bank loans 
proved more difficult to obtain on terms that were acceptable to TBSF owner-managers.   More than a 
third (10 cases) of the 25 loan applications were turned down by the banks, mainly relating to 
insufficient trading record and collateral for younger TBSFs and changes resulting in more restrictive 
bank lending policy impacting on established TBSFs. However, even when bank loans were offered, 
they were not always taken up. Only nine of the 13 firms that were offered term loans eventually took 
them up because some owner-managers found the conditions relating to the level of personal 
guarantee and collateral and costs (fees and interest rates) unacceptable.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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VC and equity finance 
Although many TBSF owner-managers remained reluctant to seek equity finance, largely because of 
concerns about the implications for retaining managerial control of their business, it is clear that 
access to equity and venture capital is important for a significant proportion of them, especially those 
needing risk capital to finance R&D, product testing and commercialisation. Whereas 23 per cent of 
surveyed TBSFs sought VC and equity finance during the 2007-10 period, this compares with less 
than one per cent of the SME population as a whole in both 2007 and 2010.  More than a third (37 per 
cent) of the bio/life science and 29 per cent of spin out TBSFs sought this type of finance. This is 
confirmed by the binary logistic analysis which shows that the bio/life science TBSFs were significantly 
more likely to seek (.01 level) and obtain (.01 level) VC and equity finance (Tables 6a and 6b), 
underlining the greater reliance of these businesses on this type of funding.  One in eight TBSFs (12 
per cent) applied to VC funds and one in seven (14 per cent) approached business angels (Table 7). 
In line with the escalator, younger firms were more likely to seek funding from business angels and 
public backed VC funds (such as the Scottish Co-Investment Fund) and older firms from corporate and 
institutional VC funds.  
Only half (11 firms/13 applications) of the TBSFs approaching equity/VC financiers received offers, 
typically for R&D in early stage product development and later stage product proofing/technical 
standards and working capital for manufacture, sales, marketing and distribution. Successful VC 
applications by established TBSFs were mainly for top-up or follow-on later stage VC finance from 
existing investors. However, not all the offers of risk capital were taken up, resulting in less than half of 
the cases successfully reaching a deal (Table 7). This was notably the case with business angel 
finance, with offers being rejected because business owner-managers were not prepared to relinquish 
the level of equity that investors required to compensate for low valuations at these early stages. The 
multivariate analysis shows that those TBSFs seeking their first round of equity finance during the 
2007-10 period had the greatest difficulties in obtaining it (<.05 level; Table 6c), underlining the 
problems new and early stage TBSFs that are R&D intensive typically face in attracting external 
investors to their business.   
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Other types of finance 
One quarter of the surveyed TBSFs applied for public sector grants and awards over the 2007-10 
period and 16 per cent applied for a variety of other finance sources including bank asset finance, 
supplier finance, and joint venture finance. The vast majority (88 per cent) of grant applications were 
completely successful, with a further eight per cent receiving at least some of the grant funding applied 
for (Table 7). Grants ranged from small-scale marketing and export grants to sizeable R&D grants 
(including SMART awards in the case of Scottish TBSFs) and European FP7 awards involving 
collaboration between TBSFs and universities. Younger TBSFs (30 per cent of them) were particularly 
active and successful in seeking grants, notably in relation to innovation and product R&D, underlining 
the important role of early stage public backed seed funding (Oakey 2003; Murray 2007). With one or 
two exceptions, the TBSFs were able to find the matched funding required. 
The use of other forms of external finance was largely driven by failure to secure all or at least some of 
the formal funding applied for from banks and equity investors. For example, businesses that were 
unable to obtain or increase overdraft facilities for working capital and to alleviate short-term cash-flow 
issues were highly likely to use personal credit card finance, with at least two businesses raising in 
excess of £10,000 in order to service new customer orders. A concern for longer term R&D projects, 
notably in bio/life sciences, was the problem of being beyond the initial concept grant stage, but not 
advanced enough to attract investment from large pharmaceutical companies, larger VC funding or 
term loan bank finance. This led to several businesses existing on a part-time or free labour basis, with 
minimal investment from universities or private individuals such as family and friends. In a couple of 
exceptional cases, nearer to the prototyping stage, the businesses had managed to secure funding 
from customer investors who could gain a market leading advantage from a new innovative product.            
External finance and growth performance 
The above findings therefore present a rather mixed picture in terms of the ability of the surveyed 
TBSFs to obtain formal external finance over the 2007-10 period, with a high level of success being 
achieved in relation to bank overdraft finance and grant based finance on the one hand, but greater 
difficulty being experienced in obtaining bank loan finance and equity finance on the other.  Overall, 
more than four fifths (82 per cent) of TBSFs seeking formal external finance in this period stated that it 
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had become harder to obtain. More than one third (36 per cent) reported problems in accessing formal 
external finance that negatively impacted on their business performance, whereas nine per cent of the 
SME population as a whole were similarly affected in this period (IFF 2011). Most affected were 
younger TBSFs (41 per cent of them), spin outs (52 per cent) and bioscience firms (45 per cent), 
typically experiencing slower growth as R&D, product development, manufacturing and sales 
developments were curtailed.  More than a quarter (26 per cent) had slowed down or reduced R&D 
activity and a number of longer term R&D projects had gone into virtual hibernation for periods of 
many months whilst time and existing funding was spent searching for further finance. Binary logistic 
analysis (Table 6d) demonstrates that spin outs were most significantly affected (<.05 level) by a lack 
of external finance, as well as being significantly (<.05 level) correlated with those firms reporting 
being affected by the credit crunch. Problems in obtaining external finance had a negative impact on 
the sales performance from 2007 to 2010 of trading businesses, as a significantly higher proportion 
(<.1 level) of those reporting such problems failed to achieve sales turnover growth. Those trading 
businesses experiencing problems accessing bank finance (particularly loan finance) were most 
significantly affected (<.01 level).   
[Insert Table 6d about here] 
Unsurprisingly, it was the fastest growing TBSFs that had the greatest demand for external finance. 
Two fifths of surveyed TBSFs trading between 2007-10 exhibited high growth (defined as at least 50 
per cent increase in sales turnover in this period) and of these,  71 per cent sought formal external 
finance compared to 57 per cent of their lower growth counterparts (4). Whilst the binary logistic 
analysis does not reveal any significant evidence that these high growth TBSFs had been adversely 
affected by lack of external finance, these businesses were significantly (<.01 level) more likely to seek 
equity finance than their lower growth counterparts and demonstrated a slightly higher tendency to 
report negative impacts due to receiving less finance than required (39 per cent compared to 30 per 
cent). Overall, the evidence here suggests that the surveyed TBSFs are more growth oriented than 
typical UK SMEs, are more likely to seek external finance, particularly equity finance, but that their 
growth is being held back by difficulties in accessing the finance need (supporting our third 
proposition).  Moreover, this is significantly worse for the growth oriented spinout TBSFs.   
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Perspectives of Business Owner-Managers and Finance Providers 
Bank debt finance  
There was agreement amongst both business owner-managers and finance providers that accessing 
bank finance had become more difficult as a result of the actions taken by the banks in responding to 
the financial crisis.  There were a number of interrelated aspects to this.   
First, it was noted that the banks had become more cautious and risk averse in lending to TBSFs. In 
reviewing applications for debt finance, banks are primarily concerned with assessing downside risks 
i.e. the ability of the business to repay the loan as well as the security that the business can offer 
against the possibility of defaulting on the loan.  Our evidence is consistent with Berger and Udell’s  
(1998) prediction that financial distress in the banking sector will have an adverse impact on small 
firms as banks cut back on lending to reduce their credit risk exposure and rebuild their capital bases. 
As a result of the market uncertainties during the recent economic downturn, banks have been 
pushing more of the risks onto businesses themselves, by requiring more asset based security and 
directors’ guarantees than previously as well as wanting to see more proof of advance orders and 
sales contracts before advancing finance. The latter proved particularly difficult for some younger 
TBSFs that needed more funding to be able to market and manufacture their products, but could not 
secure bank financing until they could show that they had definite orders. The CEO of a young digital 
measuring device company explained these difficulties: “We required £170,000 to fund a product 
launch and I was amazed when my bank was unwilling to support a loan backed by my £1 million 
home. It took a while but I eventually obtained a personal mortgage loan from the third bank visited.” 
An indication of the risks that bankers perceive in lending to TBSFs is the surprisingly high proportion 
of loan applications (12 of the 25 businesses applying for bank loans) which were made under either 
the Small Firms Loan Guarantee (SFLG) or the subsequent Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) 
schemes (5), given that SFLG/EFG is designed to operate at the margins of commercial lending 
decisions, affecting between one and two per cent of all bank loans. This could indicate that the 
surveyed TBSFs were either more knowledgeable about the bank lending market than most SMEs, or 
were seen as being more marginal in bank lending terms. Since most of the TBSFs that applied under 
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the SFLG/EFG schemes were unsuccessful, it would seem to indicate that the banks still viewed them 
as unattractive lending propositions despite the government guarantee. Others were offered loans but 
found the terms unacceptable, as in the case of an owner-manager who found that: “even under the 
EFG, I was still required to put up a 25 per cent personal guarantee”.    
Second, obtaining debt finance had become more expensive for many TBSFs as a result of changes 
in bank policy, with the tightening up of bank finance through the Basel regulations (6) leading to 
banks reducing their debt exposure and passing their increased costs onto customers.  Many TBSF 
owner managers complained about the higher interest rates as well as increased set up and 
arrangement fees. For example, one owner-manager complained: ”The bank’s offer was quite steep. 
We were required to pay a 9.7 per cent fixed rate, 2 per cent ongoing underwriting charges and with a 
1.5 per cent set-up fee for a £100,000 loan”. Another owner-manager mentioned: “The bank offered us 
7 per cent above base, with a half per cent set-up fee and a requirement that the entire £800,000 loan 
be secured by the directors’ personal assets, which we found unacceptable.” 
Others found that banks were only prepared to offer more expensive forms of finance (e.g. invoice 
financing based on sales order books). As mentioned above, four out of the thirteen businesses that 
were offered bank loans decided not to take them up because they found the terms and conditions 
unacceptable. One owner manager summed up why they rejected the bank’s offer as follows: “We had 
been in a similar position a few years ago, both parties knew that nothing had changed but, unlike 
previously, the bank was prepared to offer but on totally unacceptable terms both with regard to 
interest rates and personal guarantees. There was clearly no point in pursuing matters further.”   This 
comment indicates that some TBSF managers’ expectations of the costs of obtaining debt finance 
were based on their previous experience at a time when debt finance was relatively cheap and the 
risks of default less than in the current economic circumstances. These unacceptable terms and 
conditions are likely to discourage TBSFs from seeking bank finance in the future, resulting in a 
growing latent demand for debt finance (Fraser 2009; Oakey 2007).  
Third, from the perspective of the interviewed bankers themselves, debt finance was not what many of 
the businesses needed, particularly in the case of new and young TBSFs. They commented that 
inexperienced TBSF owner managers often did not understand the difference between debt and equity 
finance and that they turned down some applications because businesses needed more equity to fund 
18 
 
the early stages of business development. This indicates a knowledge gap on the part of those owner-
managers who are more familiar with internal and debt financing and less familiar with the sources of 
capital needed to fund growth (Van Auken 2001). This is supported by the business survey evidence 
as younger TBSFs appeared to be less knowledgeable about equity funding than their more 
established counterparts, most of whom had managers with previous experience of accessing this 
type of finance.  
Based on the interconnections in the finance escalator between different sources of finance, it might 
be expected that success in attracting investment from business angels or VC funds would improve a 
business’s chances of obtaining bank debt finance, one of the benefits of angel and VC involvement 
being that it can reduce information asymmetries thereby facilitating access to other forms of capital 
(Colombo and Grilli 2010). However, there were very few examples from our TBSF survey of this 
occurring during the financial crisis, one exception being a young biotechnology company that 
managed to obtain a £250,000 SFLGS loan on the back of successfully negotiating £3 million of equity 
funding from a public supported VC fund and a business angel network.   
And fourth, from the perspective of most business owner-managers themselves, the relationship they 
have with their existing bank is important to them, despite the difficulties they may have experienced in 
accessing finance. Whilst longer relationships are considered to improve the availability of finance and 
lending terms (e.g. lower collateral requirements and bank charges) (Berger and Udell 1995), recent 
research showed an increase in bank switching during the financial crisis as a result of dissatisfaction 
with bank charges and terms (Fraser, 2009). However, two thirds (64 per cent) of the surveyed TBSFs 
seeking bank finance were reluctant to shop around, preferring to stay with the bank with which they 
had an existing relationship (for new firms, often through personal banking experience) and assuming 
that if they were unsuccessful, they would be unlikely to fare any better with other banks.  
A common criticism amongst surveyed TBSF owner-managers was that their local relationship 
manager appeared to have little influence when it came to making the final decision on their funding 
applications which, apart from those relating to small overdraft facilities, tended to be made centrally.  
Typical comments included: “we experienced a high turnover of local managers, making it difficult to 
develop a relationship” and that “local managers are more interested in selling the bank’s products 
rather than trying to understand the needs of the business”. A common view was that there had been 
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a deskilling of business knowledge and understanding at the local branch level over recent years. 
Moreover, relationship banking has taken a back seat since the onset of the credit crunch as banks 
have placed more emphasis on the results of using computerised capital based risk assessment 
methods. As Freel (2007) found in research on small firms applying for bank loans, this trend has 
particularly worked against the interests of small innovative and R&D intensive firms given their limited 
tangible assets and greater market uncertainties. 
Also, there are grounds for thinking that the bank mergers that have been a response to the credit 
crunch have resulted in the banks themselves investing less in relationship banking, given previous 
arguments that there is less incentive for banks to pursue relationship banking when there is less 
competition between them because of less pressure to differentiate their services (Boot and Thakor 
2000). This would suggest that the increasing consolidation of banking is resulting in individual banks 
becoming less customer driven and client focused than previously.   
VC & equity finance 
As mentioned earlier, there has been a reduction in new private and institutional equity finance in the 
UK over the last decade, leaving an equity gap particularly for new and early stage TBSFs. Our study 
evidence tends to confirm the existence of this equity gap and suggests that, if anything the financial 
crisis has resulted in a further widening of the gap due to several related factors.  
First, unlike the banks where the focus is largely on downside risks, VC investors are primarily 
concerned with assessing the upside potential of the business and the probability of making a return 
on their investments. According to the interviewed investors, their main criteria in assessing 
applications are the presence of a strong management team, preferably with a proven track record 
and/or willingness to strengthen management capabilities by taking on non executive directors with 
commercial and sector specific skills; a novel and ‘big enough idea’ to be interesting; a clear route to 
market and potential for fulfilling a market need; and an exit strategy whereby the investment is 
saleable to others. However, the market uncertainties associated with the economic downturn have 
meant that it has become more difficult to satisfy these criteria, leading to greater uncertainties about 
the likelihood of business success. 
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Second, potential investors have become deterred from making new investments in new and early 
stage TBSFs by the poor returns on their existing investments and the difficulties of exiting from them. 
It is now taking longer than normal to realise returns on investments, with increased funding rounds 
being necessary to ensure the survival of the business and meet the rising cost of R&D. In addition, 
more incremental stages of business angel follow-on investment have become necessary to bridge the 
gap created by the shift of VC funds to lower risk later stage investments. Thus funds have become 
locked into existing investments rather than becoming available for new investments.  
The difficulties of obtaining early stage equity finance were also apparent from the TBSF survey. Five 
of the eight businesses that made unsuccessful applications for equity funding were rejected because 
the finance was for early stage product developments that investors considered to be too risky and 
not ready for investment. For example, a director of a university spin out business concerned with bio-
mass power technology who had previous equity raising experience observed that it was getting 
harder to find early stage equity finance, having spent two years searching without yet finalising a 
deal: “the main barrier is getting the initial tranche of equity finance and this has held back the 
development of the business”. And the CEO of another university spin out biotechnology business 
observed that: “it is getting harder to raise funds as there seem to be fewer investors and those that 
are investing are sticking to their current investments”, whilst the finance director of a bio-tech 
company questioned “the short-sightedness of lurching through numerous tranches of small scale 
equity funding in the hope of achieving eventual success.” Several of these businesses had found 
themselves struggling for funding, after initial seed grant and founder investment, with R&D work 
progressing slower than planned whilst the search for equity investment ensued. One bio science 
business had been “seeking funding for over three years”, whilst a chemical soil testing business had 
“explored many forms of venture capital including government backed schemes, but they don’t 
understand our business and want to see orders, done deals and guaranteed success.”        
 
Third, despite these difficulties on the supply side, the view of interviewed investors and fund 
managers was that the demand for equity finance had grown over the last three years, this being 
seen as a shift away from bank debt finance which had become more expensive. Other recent 
research has also suggested that the difficulties in obtaining debt finance may lead more small firms 
to seek external equity funding if they are not prepared to abandon their investment projects 
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altogether (Cowling, Liu and Ledger 2012). It is interesting to note in this respect that the TBSF 
survey evidence showed that a higher proportion (19 per cent) of TBSFs were expecting to be 
seeking equity finance over the next three years than expected to apply for bank finance (14 per 
cent). Equity investors indicated that they may look at hundreds of investment proposals annually, but 
actually invest in very few, typically less than five and sometimes just one or two new investments. 
They also indicated that they have become more cautious and protective of their investments, 
requiring more stringent due diligence, tighter legal requirements and increased equity shareholdings, 
which has led to a doubling in the time to find, negotiate and arrange finance. Moreover, several 
investors felt that the lack of success reflected the insufficient quality of applications received and that 
more professionalism and innovativeness is needed in the applications from TBSF entrepreneurs. 
From a supply side perspective therefore, there is a demand side problem relating to a lack of 
attractive investment propositions as well as a need for business investor readiness programmes 
(Mason and Harrison 2001; Mason and Kwok 2010; Rasmussen and Sørheim 2012). 
Fourth, it would appear that investors are, if anything requiring larger stakes in investee businesses 
than in the past. Our survey evidence shows that the 13 TBSFs that were successful in obtaining 
equity/VC finance were willing to cede considerable equity share in their businesses (median 25 per 
cent). Unsurprisingly, there tended to be a greater willingness to cede equity in the case of spin out 
companies than non spin outs. In the most extreme case of an R&D intensive spin out needing a 
substantial investment (£10 million) to progress products to clinical trials and licensing sales, the 
owners found that: “even though we were willing to offer up to 90 per cent of the business, there was 
no interest in early stage funding from private VC or corporate funds”.  However, several TBSFs 
rejected the offers they received because they were not prepared to relinquish the share of equity 
asked for.  For example, a new TBSF rejected £100,000 of business angel funding after a search of 18 
months because: “although this funding would have been ideal for product development, the investor 
wanted more than the 25 per cent share offered.” 
And finally, fund managers and industry experts also highlighted two other issues which are disturbing 
the flow of equity investment in the UK. First, even with the development of angel syndicates/ 
networks, they are not always able to see investment projects through to achieving a satisfactory 
return by making successive follow-on investments. This situation has been exacerbated by private 
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VC funds withdrawing investments to later stages and instances of ‘crushing’, whereby angels are not 
able to sell their investments to VCs at optimal market rates, because the VC funds hold back until 
they can negotiate more advantageous terms for their investments (Lerner et al. 2011). And second, 
the combination of a slow down in intermediate (i.e. angel sales to VCs) and final trade sale activity in 
the UK has led to protraction of the development cycle and locking-in of investment funds. For 
example, Mason et al (2010) presents London Stock Exchange data for small-scale IPOs in the UK 
AIM market demonstrating a fall from peak fund raising in 2006 of over £6.5 billion in over 300 
companies to less than £1 billion in fewer than 20 companies for 2008 and 2009. Accordingly, the UK 
now lacks a culture of multi-stage investment and a healthy public market exit route (Lerner et al. 
2011). 
 
Grant based finance 
Over the last decade there has been a growing role for public backed finance initiatives, with the UK 
government becoming a major source of seed and early stage finance (Oakey 2003; Murray 2007; 
Wright et al. 2006). Early stage investments with public backing increased from 20 per cent in 2000 to 
68 per cent by 2008 (Pierrakis 2010). The majority of interviewed finance providers agreed that 
government has a vital role in filling the gap left by the banks and the VCs in seed and early stage 
funding, such as through grant schemes and public backed VC and mezzanine funds (e.g. Enterprise 
Capital Funds). Interestingly, some interviewees felt that as a means of achieving national economic 
recovery and growth, there was now a need for a greater volume of deals involving public backed 
finance in order to meet early stage finance demand, enabling more TBSFs to grow, spawn other 
enterprises and generate multiplier effects (7). 
 
As detailed above, public sector grants have been an important source of finance for R&D over the 
2007-10 period for a quarter of the surveyed TBSFs. However, there were concerns that current UK 
public spending cutbacks together with the shift from a regionally targeted funding mechanism to a 
national competitive mechanism will reduce the amount of grant funding available to new and early 
stage TBSFs. Yet an important positive externality of public programmes aimed at innovative small 
firms is that they certify early stage projects (Lerner 1999). Thus R&D grants can be perceived by 
other finance providers as helping to accredit technological innovations, thereby helping to reduce the 
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risks associated with information asymmetry (Murray and Lott 1995).  It follows that if the money 
devoted to R&D grants is reduced and they become more difficult to obtain, this could in turn make it 
more difficult for TBSFs to secure other sources of finance.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence presented in this paper from a survey of surviving independent UK TBSFs 
demonstrates that they were more growth seeking and active in seeking formal external finance over 
the 2007-10 period than SMEs as a whole, maintaining a strong demand for both debt and equity 
finance since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 and continuing to forecast strong demand for 
finance over the next three years. This was particularly the case for TBSFs in the bio/life sciences, 
which tend to be R&D intensive firms with a high demand for equity risk finance. Overall, these 
businesses appear to have been less affected by demand constraints during the economic downturn 
than their electronic/IT counterparts, and achieved stronger growth in sales turnover and employment. 
However, accessing formal external finance has become more difficult and is expected by TBSF 
owner-managers to remain so, with our findings showing those TBSFs seeking early stage finance to 
be the worst affected.  More than a third of TBSFs considered that financial constraints had held back 
their growth, noticeably the case with spin outs and bio/life science firms which tend to be the most 
R&D intensive and innovative businesses. Two thirds of those expecting to need external finance in 
the next few years harboured concerns about their ability to access it.  
 
The more interpretive evidence from both TBSF owner-managers and finance providers confirms our 
fourth proposition that the interconnectedness and substitutability between different sources of 
finance required for the continuity of funding has proved difficult to achieve under recent financial 
market conditions. More specifically, as applied to the UK, the finance escalator model has become 
‘deeply flawed’ (Gill 2010), with a number of break points along the stages of the business and 
innovation development cycle which are slowing progress and potentially holding back growth. This 
study highlights four key breakages in the escalator, where further market intervention by government 
may be required. 
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First, the study reveals a considerable demand and use of seed and early stage finance. Whilst soft 
starts have been shown to be able to access bank debt finance, because they already have 
customers and order books, for more intensive R&D activities grant finance has proved vital. Recent 
reductions in UK seed grant funds and the shift from an established regionally targeted funding 
mechanism to a national competitive mechanism have raised concerns amongst younger surveyed 
TBSFs. This type of finance is not only crucial to getting R&D underway, but has also proved a 
catalyst for leveraging in finance from other sources.   
 
Second, the existing equity finance gap (commonly thought to be in the £250,000 to £2m range) has 
been exacerbated by business angel investment blockages and a shortfall of new early stage private 
equity investment, along with the continuing trend for VCs to make fewer, but larger sized investments 
focused at later stages. Consequently, there is a growing divide between angels and private VC 
funds, representing a considerable step in the finance escalator, with signs that new later stage VC 
funding has become much harder to secure. The overall picture is of less small-scale equity funding 
being available and a sourcing process which has doubled in length with considerably increased cost 
(both in administration and equity share).   
 
Third, in relation to debt finance, our evidence indicates that TBSFs have been adversely affected by 
the actions taken by banks to reduce their debt exposure and to transfer more of the risks onto 
businesses themselves. For more established businesses where debt finance was offered, in several 
cases the terms were too expensive or demanding, requiring higher levels of security and collateral 
than the owner-managers were prepared to accept. In part, it may be argued that debt finance is 
available, but that the owner-managers perceptions are based on their experiences during the 
previous era of cheap finance.  
 
Fourth, it is increasingly evident that longer-scale intensive R&D found in bio/life sciences and 
clean/alternative energies requires equity risk financing at levels which go far beyond the present EU 
state aid cap of £2 million for public supported VC schemes, perhaps as high as £10 million 
(Rowlands 2009). This study found a number of ventures that, after initial seed funding, were laying 
almost dormant over several years whilst owner-managers took on an almost full-time job seeking 
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middle stage R&D equity risk finance. With the decline in the UK IPO market (Mason, Jones and 
Wells 2010) there is a growing demand for larger scale middle stage equity funding that is prepared to 
invest for at least 3-5 years, rather than the later stage funding which is perceived as offering lower 
risk and quicker returns over 1-3 years and that private/institutional VCs are currently investing in.  
 
This paper therefore supports the view that there are a number of breakage points in the UK finance 
escalator which are resulting in a widening and deepening of the finance gap facing TBSFs, and 
holding back their growth. This is not just for early stage finance, but increasingly for later stage R&D 
investment as well. A variety of forms of government intervention are required in order to stimulate 
private investment and achieve the interconnectedness between the different sources of finance 
needed for the smooth, sequential financing of TBSFs. These public initiatives should include the 
maintenance of an adequate level of grant seed funding; the stimulation of private sector investment 
(such as via the existing Enterprise Investment Scheme); continued interventions to provide small-
scale earlier stage VC funding preferably through scaled-up public VC funds and co-investment 
initiatives with business angels; and larger scale, perhaps pan European public backed VC schemes 
(such as the current UK Innovation Investment Fund) which can plug the gap in larger mid-stage 
funding. In the current economic climate, these would appear to be essential cornerstones to assisting 
future TBSF growth and development.         
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End Notes: 
 
(1) TBSFs are defined broadly here as independently owned and managed enterprises with less than 
250 employees whose products and services embody innovative and advanced technologies 
developed by the application of scientific and technological expertise and fit within the high tech 
sectors defined by Bullock and Millner (2003). 
 
(2) It may be argued that trade sales are representative of the more successful TBSF outcomes, but 
they may also result from poor performing businesses being acquired cheaply. The management and 
characteristics of trade sales businesses remaining in the UK are also likely to be transformed into a 
mature large business context. These larger businesses will have completely different financing 
structures and relationships with financing organisations and will be difficult to reconcile within this 
study of independent TBSFs. 
 
(3) 2010 sales turnover deflated by 105.9 (i.e. 94.4 per cent) to reflect UK GDP growth from base year 
of 2007 (source: UK Office of National Statistics). 
 
(4) Interestingly, this is in line with the trend found in the Eurostat (2011) SME access to finance data 
covering the same period from 20 European Union countries. This showed that high growth (59 per 
cent) and gazelle SMEs (57 per cent) exhibited higher demand for finance than their lower growth 
counterparts (just over 50 per cent). 
 
(5)The SFLG, first introduced in 1981, was the UK’s publicly funded debt guarantee scheme until 
January 2009 when it was replaced by the EFG in an attempt to stimulate additional bank lending to 
SMEs. 
 
(6)  Basel III (16/12/2010) requires that: banks hold 4.5 per cent common equity (up from 2 per cent) 
and 6 per cent of Tier I capital (up from 4 per cent) of risk-weighted assets; introduce a mandatory 
capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent and discretionary countercyclical buffer of up to 2.5 per cent 
of capital during periods of high credit growth; introduce a minimum 3 per cent leverage ratio and two 
required liquidity ratios, requiring banks hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover total net cash 
flows over 30 days; the Net Stable Funding Ratio requires the available amount of stable funding to 
exceed the required amount of stable funding over a one-year period of extended stress.  
 
(7) It is interesting to note that support for this view comes from Lerner (2010) who argues that 
government backed VC programmes (in the US and Europe) have tended to be concentrated in 
periods when VC funds were at their most active anyway, whereas it is periods such as the recent 
financial crisis when public backed programmes are most needed.    
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Table 1: Sectoral distribution of surveyed TBSFs 
 
Sector (Electronic/Bio 
science split) 
All surveyed 
firms 
Sample 1: 
Established firms 
Sample 2: 
Younger firms 
 
ABI 2008 
No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % 
IT software (7/0) 7 7.0 3 5.9 4 8.2 2,530 1.8 
IT services (14/0) 14 14.0 8 15.7 6 12.2 111,268 77.7 
Electronic Engineering 
(18/0) 18 18.0 8 15.7 10 20.4 5,571 3.9 
Telecommunication (5/0) 
5 5.0 3 5.9 2 4.1 8,635 6.0 
Scientific Instruments/ 
Engineering (17/0) 17 17.0 10 19.6 7 14.3 5,194 3.6 
Chemical Engineering 
(0/4) 4 4.0 3 5.9 1 2.0 567 0.4 
Medical/Pharmaceuticals 
(0/10) 10 10.0 7 13.7 3 6.1 692 0.4 
Research and 
Development (0/22) 22 22.0 7 13.7 15 30.6 4,571 3.2 
Consultancy/Business 
Support (1/2) 3 3.0 2 3.9 1 2.0 4,178 3.0 
Total 100 100 51 100 49 100 143,206 100 
Note: UK Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) 2008 data refers to numbers of pay units as proxies for 
businesses  
 
Digital Electronic/IT sectors (SIC2003): 3001/2 Office and Computers; 3110 Electrical motors; 3120 
Electrical controls; 3210 Electrical components; 3220 TV and Radio; 3320 Measuring devices; 3330 
Process controls; 3340 Optical; 3530 Aircraft; 6420 Telecomms; 7210 Hardware consultancy; 7221/2 
Publishing software; 7230/40 Data; 7260 Other computing     
Bio/Life science sectors (SIC2003): 2416/7 Plastics; 2441/2 Pharmaceuticals; 3310 Medical; 7310/20 
R&D consultancy 
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Table 2:  Interviewed finance providers 
 
Type Frequency 
Private VCs  3 
Public VCs 2 
Mezzanine fund managers 3 
Business angels 6 
Bankers 3 
Grants 1 
TBSF sector experts/facilitators 2 
Total 20 
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Table 3:  Growth orientation and constraints of surveyed TBSFs  
 All TBSFs (n=100) 
Established TBSFs 
(n=51) Younger TBSFs (n=49) 
Growth orientation No. % No. % No. % 
Growth  67 67 33 64.7 34 69.4 
Survival 15 15 10 19.6 5 10.2 
No need 8 8 6 11.8 2 4.1 
Not ready 10 10 2 3.9 8 16.3 
Constraints       
None 14 14 8 15.7 6 12.2 
Finance 24 24 11 21.6 13 26.5 
Lack of demand 34 34 19 37.3 15 30.6 
Workforce 8 8 8 15.7 0 0 
Management time 6 6 3 5.9 3 6.1 
Technical barriers 6 6 3 5.9 3 6.1 
Trade regulations 3 3 1 2 2 4.1 
Premises 3 3 0 0 3 6.1 
Sales & marketing 5 5 0 0 5 10.2 
Note: 3 cases mentioned two main constraints 
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Table 4: Growth characteristics of surveyed TBSFs  
(a) Number of Employees (b) Sales Turnover 
All Firms  
Change Employment No. % 
Sales 
Turnover No. % 
2007-10 Increased 45 49 Increased 46 59 
2007-10 Stable  34 37 Stable 10 13 
2007-10 Decreased 13 14 Decreased 22 28 
  Established Firms    
2007-10 Increased 25 49 Increased 23 54 
2007-10 Stable 17 33 Stable  6 14 
2007-10 Decreased 9 18 Decreased 14 33 
  Younger Firms    
2007-10 Increased 20 48 Increased 23 66 
2007-10 Stable 17 42 Stable 4 11 
2007-10 Decreased 4 10 Decreased 8 23 
      
  
Full-time 
mean 
Part-time 
  mean 
All Firms (n=92) 
  mean              median    mean median 
2007 9.1 0.9 10.1 4 2006-07 £1,138,700 £300,000 
2010 12.2 1.2 13.3 5.5 2009-10 £1,625,200 £500,000 
2011 13.8 1.2 15 7 2010-11 £1,946,700 £500,000 
Established Firms (n=51) 
 Full-time Part-time Total    
2007 13.5 1.1 14.5 5 2006-07 £1,840,300 £600,000 
2010 16.8 1.4 18.3 6 2009-10 £2,490,000 £824,000 
2011 18.4 1.5 19.9 8 2010-11 £2,931,800 £1,000,000 
Younger Firms (n=41) 
 Full-time Part-time Total    
2007 3.7 0.8 4.6  3 2006-07 £292,600 £106,000 
2010 6.3 0.8 7.2 4 2009-10 £582,400 £230,000 
2011 8 0.8 8.9 6 2010-11 £758,800 £400,000 
Note:  Employee data: Established firms n=51; Younger firms n=41 (8 TBSFs not established prior to 
2007) 
Sales turnover data: n=75 (established n=41, younger n=34) where complete data for each 
year represented (78 had complete data for 2007 and 2010 and 75 for 2007, 2010 and 2011)  
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Table 5:  Funding for the surveyed TBSFs in the last 3 years 
 All TBSFs  No of firms Percentage 
Internal sources (e.g. Ploughing back profits, personal funding) 81 81 
Informal external sources (e.g. Family and friends) 6 6 
Formal external sources (e.g. Banks, VC funds, public sector grants) 53 53 
Established TBSFs  
Internal sources (e.g. Ploughing back profits, personal funding) 44 86 
Informal external sources (e.g. Family and friends) 1 2 
Formal external sources (e.g. Banks, VC funds, public sector grants) 26 52 
Younger TBSFs  
Internal sources (e.g. Ploughing back profits, personal funding) 37 75 
Informal external sources (e.g. Family and friends) 5 10 
Formal external sources (e.g. Banks, VC funds, public sector grants) 27 55 
Note:  Some businesses used more than one source  
35 
 
Table 6a: Binary Logistic Analysis for those TBSFs Seeking External Finance (dependent 
variable)  
 
Model 1: 1. All TBSFs 2. Trading 
(sales) TBSFs 
3. Bank Finance 4. Equity 
Finance 
Independent 
variable 
 B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
Bio/Life science 
.733 .097 1.335 .022 .524 .227 1.338 .010 
Innovation change 
-.596 .212 -.467 .420 -.546 .250 -.166 .780 
Credit crunch 
.165 .770 -.189 .781 -.050 .927 .993 .096 
Established 5+ 
years  
.152 .747 .519 .518 -.402 .387 -.457 .433 
Sales up 
n/a n/a .105 .889 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
High growth 
n/a n/a -.003 .997 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Profit up 
n/a n/a .201 .731 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Spinout 
.534 .269 .395 .502 .302 .522 .111 .852 
Growth aim 
-.510 .281 -.765 .221 .230 .621 -1.024 .060 
Constant 
.124 .810 -.012 .986 -.164 .747 -1.090 .073 
N= 100 78 100 100 
Nagelkerke R 
square 
.110 .186 .075 .250 
-2 Log Likelihood 129.643 95.633 132.481 93.266 
Note:  Bio/life science as opposed to Electronics/IT 
 Innovation change in business taken place in period 2007-10 
 Performance affected by credit crunch 
 Business performance real terms improvement (sales, profits) 2007-10 
 High growth where at least 50% increase in sales 
 
Table 6b: Binary Logistic Analysis for those TBSFs Receiving External Finance (dependent 
variable)  
 
Model 2a: 2. Trading 
(sales) 
3. Bank Finance 4. Equity 
Finance 
Independent 
variable 
 B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
Bio/Life science 
2.846 .000 1.450 .014 4.626 .010 
Innovation change 
-.190 .763 -.928 .119 2.657 .124 
Credit crunch 
-.112 .880 -.269 .698 -.832 .611 
Established 5+ 
years  
-.875 .176 -.877 .146 -3.015 .088 
Sales up 
-.818 .219 -.415 .500 -2.992 .097 
High growth 
-.415 .540 .813 .200 -1.459 .300 
Profit up 
-.923 .292 -.323 .705 1.938 1.000 
Spinout 
.071 .931 -.433 .590 19.881 .998 
Growth aim 
.655 .429 .553 .506 .020 .993 
Constant 
.841 .285 -.410 .556 -23.19 .996 
N= 78 78 78 
Nagelkerke R 
square 
.353 .233 .684 
-2 Log Likelihood 83.042 90.061 20.221 
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Table 6c: Binary Logistic Analysis for those TBSFs Receiving External Finance (dependent 
variable) including Stage and Round of Finance  
 
Model 2b: 1. All Seekers 2. Bank Finance 3. Equity 
Finance 
Independent 
variable 
 B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
Innovation change 
1.365 .254 .051 .946 1.116 .275 
Credit crunch 
1.843 .170 -.350 .674 -.648 .553 
Established 5+ 
years  
-1.818 .124 -2.287 .013 -.313 .765 
Spinout 
-2.424 .033 -1.794 .030 .219 .829 
Growth aim 
.412 .686 1.677 .021 -.189 .861 
Bio/Life science 1.005 .279 .595 .388 .833 .412 
Early stage -2.017 .073 -2.631 .002 -1.354 .233 
Early round .023 .984 .827 .312 -2.719 .017 
Constant 
3.409 .048 .760 .436 -.740 .530 
N= 66 66 66 
Nagelkerke R 
square 
.312 .468 .319 
-2 Log Likelihood 39.964 62.005 39.689 
Note:  Early stage refers to seed and early stage R&D funding 
 Early round refers to first round funding 
 
 
Table 6d: Binary Logistic Analysis for those TBSFs where Difficulties Obtaining External 
Finance Affected Business Performance (dependent variable)  
 
Model 3: 1. All Seekers 2. Trading 
(sales)  
3. Trading/Finance 
Independent 
variable 
 B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
Innovation change 
-.568 .281 -.781 .226 -.152 .892 
Credit crunch 
1.133 .048 1.208 .088 1.824 .103 
Established 5+ 
years  
.249 .629 .562 .391 1.491 .118 
Spinout 
1.155 .025 1.300 .041 1.779 .068 
Growth aim 
-.351 .485 .019 .976 -.142 .873 
Bio/Life science .356 .441 .378 .525 -.294 .716 
Sales up 
n/a n/a -2.121 .080 -3.272 .138 
High growth 
n/a n/a 1.917 .120 .889 .565 
Profit up 
n/a n/a .157 .877 1.630 .326 
Bank finance 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 4.565 .002 
Equity finance 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.161 .051 
Constant 
-1.088 .056 -1.307 .092 -5.665 .001 
N= 100 78 78 
Nagelkerke R 
square 
.187 .278 .676 
-2 Log Likelihood 116.055 81.876 47.220 
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Table 7:  Formal external funding sources approached 2007-10 and outcomes 
Source 
Approached 
No (% of n*) 
Success 
Rate*** 
(Row %) 
Outcome 
 
Bank overdraft 
All TBSFs 
Established  
Younger  
 
 
36 (36%) 
16 (32%) 
20 (40%) 
 
 
81% 
81% 
80% 
 
Successful: 26; Unsuccessful: 7; Partial: 3  
Successful: 13; Unsuccessful: 3;   
Successful: 13; Unsuccessful: 4; Partial: 3 
 
Bank loan 
All TBSFs 
 
Established  
 
Younger  
 
 
25 (25%) 
 
8 (16%) 
 
17 (34%) 
 
 
58% 
 
43% 
 
65% 
 
Successful: 13 (9 taken up); Partial: 1  
Unsuccessful: 10; Pending: 1 
Successful: 3 (3 taken up); Unsuccessful: 4;  
Pending: 1 
Successful: 10 (6 taken up); Partial: 1  
Unsuccessful: 6 
Venture capital 
fund 
All TBSFs 
 
Established 
 
Younger 
 
 
12 (12%) 
 
7 (14%) 
 
5 (10%) 
 
 
64% 
 
57% 
 
75% 
 
 
Successful: 7 (6 taken up); Unsuccessful: 4;  
Pending: 1 
Successful: 4 (3 taken up); Unsuccessful: 3  
 
Successful: 3; Unsuccessful: 1; Pending: 1 
Business angels 
All TBSFs 
Established  
Younger  
 
14 (14%) 
4 (8%) 
10 (20%) 
 
46% 
33% 
50% 
 
Successful: 6; Unsuccessful: 7 Pending:1 
Successful: 1; Unsuccessful: 2; Pending: 1  
Successful: 5 (3 taken up); Unsuccessful: 5 
 
Public sector 
grant / award 
All TBSFs 
Established  
Younger  
 
 
 
25 (25%) 
10 (20%) 
15 (30%) 
 
 
 
96% 
90% 
100% 
 
 
Successful: 22; Partial: 2; Unsuccessful: 1 
Successful: 8; Partial: 1; Unsuccessful: 1 
Successful: 14; Partial: 1 
 
Notes:   *All TBSFs n=100; Established TBSFs n=51; Younger TBSFs n=49  
**Success rate calculated as at least partially successful in obtaining finance offer, 
excluding pending decisions 
 
